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The Insanity Defense in the Twenty-First Century:
How Recent United States Supreme Court Case Law
Can Improve the System
JuLiE E. GRACHEK*
INTRODUCTION
A mentally ill prisoner "responded to the stress [of hearing another prisoner's
murder] by cutting himself, and was subsequently given a disciplinary report and
placed in an isolation cell for 'destruction of state property."" Examples such as this
illustrate that the treatment of mentally ill offenders is a debated issue in criminal law
because of the danger posed to society by those inflicted with mental illness2 and
because of the significant number of mentally ill offenders in our correctional system
today.3 In fact, this debate over how the criminal justice system should handle mentally
ill offenders has been present since the insanity defense came into existence.4 Despite
recent legislative action targeted at non violent mentally ill offenders, 5 the judicial
system must be improved in order to deal more effectively with all mentally ill
offenders, regardless of the degree of crime for which they stand accused.
The underlying problem of this debate centers around the reality that mentally ill
offenders, particularly violent offenders, are not given the opportunity to obtain
adequate rehabilitative treatment while serving their sentences. Therefore, this Note
offers a two-part recommendation for remedying this problem by increasing the
* J.D. Candidate, 2006, Indiana University School of Law-Bloomington; B.S., 2003,
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. I would like to thank my parents, Christine and
Gary, and my sister Catherine for your love and encouragement these past three years. I would
not be where I am today without your constant support. A special thank you to Professor Joseph
Hoffmann for his insightful comments. Thank you also to Tess, Zack, and the Notes and
Comments Editors for your help and suggestions.
1. First Amended Complaint at 31, Fluellen v. Wetherington, No. 1:02-CV-479-JEC (N.D.
Ga. Mar. 15, 2002).
2. See, e.g.. MICHAEL L. PERLIN, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE INsANrrY DEFENSE 68 (1994)
("[E]mpirical studies have shown, clearly and consistently, that a significant percentage of
offenders suffer from mental illness ....").
3. Mentally Ill Offender Treatment and Crime Reduction Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-
414, § 2, 118 Stat. 2327 (2004) ("According to the Bureau of Justice Statistics, over 16 percent
of adults incarcerated in United States jails and prisons have a mental illness."); see also Robert
Bernstein & Tammy Seltzer, Criminalization of People with Mental Illnesses: The Role of
Mental Health Courts in System Reform, 7 UDC L. REV. 143, 145 (2003) ("Approximately a
quarter million individuals with severe mental illnesses are incarcerated at any given
moment ...").
4. See Brian E. Elkins, Note, Idaho's Repeal of the Insanity Defense: What are We Trying
to Prove?, 31 IDAHO L. REV. 151, 161 (1994) ("Insanity was recognized as a defense by ancient
Moslem law, Hebraic law and Roman law.").
5. See § 3, 118 Stat. at 2328 (seeking to "maximize the use of alternatives to prosecution
through graduated sanctions in appropriate cases involving nonviolent offenders with mental
illness").
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effectiveness of the rehabilitative treatment received by mentally ill offenders. This
recommendation includes: 1) adoption of a guilty-except-for-insanity verdict and 2)
creation of a mental health sentencing board. This recommendation is based on a
combination of the current insanity defense system's components and improvements
developed from a recent line of case law that began with Apprendi v. New Jersey.' In
Part I, a definition of the insanity defense introduces the criminal justice system's basic
approach to dealing with mentally ill offenders. Part I also discusses the policy
rationale behind the insanity defense, which will provide a basis to later evaluate the
effectiveness of the current treatment of these offenders. Part Il illustrates the evolution
of public views regarding the insanity defense by providing an overview of the history
of the insanity defense and the treatment mentally ill offenders receive. Part III of this
Note then differentiates between common public misconceptions and justified public
concerns regarding the insanity defense. Finally, Part IV addresses the justified public
concerns by recommending that a revision should be made to the current system. By
creating a more accurate and uniformly applied insanity standard, more mentally ill
offenders will be appropriately determined "mentally ill," thereby providing for them
the opportunity to receive effective rehabilitative treatment. This recommendation also
involves shifting the responsibility of selecting the appropriate punishment of the
mentally ill offender from the lay jury to a mental health sentencing board composed of
a variety of professionals. Based on the Apprendi line of case law, the mental health
sentencing board would have the authority to select the appropriate method of
punishment falling within the boundaries of the jury-determined sentencing range in
order to meet the mental health needs of each offender.
I. THE INSANrrY DEFENSE
A. The Insanity Defense Defined
All state and federal courts find criminal liability only when the defendant's conduct
fulfills every element of the charged offense.7 The United States Constitution requires
that the prosecution prove each element beyond a reasonable doubt.8 Even when the
prosecution has met this burden of proof, the insanity defense serves as an affirmative
defense for the defendant. By pleading the insanity defense, the defendant
acknowledges that he committed the crime, but asserts that he is nonetheless "not
guilty" due to his mental illness. More specifically, a plea of not guilty by reason of
insanity (NGRI) claims that due to an extenuating circumstance (mental illness), the
defendant should not be held morally blameworthy for the crime.9 The reasoning
6. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
7. Ira Mickenberg, A Pleasant Surprise: The Guilty but Mentally Ill Verdict has Both
Succeeded in its Own Right and Successfully Preserved the Traditional Role of the Insanity
Defense, 55 U. CIN. L. REv. 943, 951 (1987) (citing In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970)).
8. In re Winship, 397 U.S. at 364 ("Lest there remain any doubt about the constitutional
stature of the reasonable-doubt standard, we explicitly hold that the Due Process Clause protects
the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact
necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged.").
9. See Mickenberg, supra note 7, at 953 (discussing the purposes of using a defense in
general).
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behind this plea is that the mental illness affects the defendant's ability to comprehend
his actions and conform his conduct to the law.'0 This rationale illustrates the notion
that there cannot be punishment when blame cannot be imposed.
By focusing on blameworthiness, the insanity defense addresses the long-standing
connection between mens rea/guilty mind and culpability. The United States Supreme
Court describes mens rea as "the ancient requirement of a culpable state of mind."'
' 2
Mental illness itself does not preclude criminal responsibility. In order to successfully
plead the insanity defense, a defendant must not only show that he is mentally ill, but
must also show that there was a nexus connecting the mental illness and the criminal
offense at issue.
13
B. The Policy Rationale Underlying the Insanity Defense
The insanity defense addresses the policy issues inherent in the question of criminal
culpability: 14 the connection between responsibility and blameworthiness. The view is
that in a criminal justice system based on free will, 15 the acts of mentally ill persons
lacking complete free will cannot fairly be judged in the same way as the acts of sane,
free-willed persons. Therefore, the insanity defense reflects the "criminal justice
system's view that the conduct of individuals who lack some degree of mental capacity
should not be judged according to general volitional and cognitive principles."' 6
Society's recognition of a moral difference between the acts of a sane person and a
mentally ill person 7 results in the insanity defense serving dual roles in the criminal
justice system: 1) as a way to distinguish between offenders who are able to conform
10. See Donald H. J. Hermann, Madness and the Criminal Law by Norval Morris, 51 GEO.
WASH. L. REv. 329, 339 (1983) (book review) (arguing against Professor Morris's reasoning of
why mad offenders are excused for their conduct).
11. Vicki L. Plaut, Punishment Versus Treatment of the Guilty but Mentally 111, 74 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 428,431 (1983) (quoting Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862,876 (D.C.
Cir. 1954) (Bazelon, J.) ("Our collective conscience does not allow punishment where it cannot
impose blame.")).
12. Elkins, supra note 4, at 163 (citing Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 250
(1952)).
13. Mickenberg, supra note 7, at 954-55.
14. See Ellen Byers, Mentally Ill Criminal Offenders and the Strict Liability Effect: Is
There Hope for a Just Jurisprudence in an Era of Responsibility/Consequences Talk?, 57 ARK.
L. REV. 447, 486 (2004) (stating that the question at the core of criminal liability is the
culpability of the defendant).
15. See Peter Arenella, Reflections on Current Proposals to Abolish or Reform the Insanity
Defense, 8 AM. J.L. & MED. 271,273 (1982) ("[The] presumption of 'free will' underl[ies] all
tests for criminal responsibility .. "); Harry J. Philips, Jr., Comment, The Insanity Defense:
Should Louisiana Change the Rules?, 44 LA. L. REV. 165, 180 (1983) ("The relationship of free
will to culpability for one's actions has become a cornerstone of our entire criminal justice
system.").
16. Lynnette S. Cobun, The Insanity Defense: Effects ofAbolition Unsupported by a Moral
Consensus, 9 AM. J.L. & MED. 471, 474-75 (1984).
17. Id. at 473; see also Arenella, supra note 15, at 274 ("[The moral perception underlying
the insanity defense [is] that it is unjust to hold a severely disabled person responsible for his
criminal conduct .. ").
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their conduct to the law as a result of punishment from those offenders who are not
able to conform their conduct to the law despite punishment, and 2) as a method of
ensuring offenders posing a threat to society are restrained.'9 The insanity defense is
used to identify offenders for whom punishment would not serve the three policy
rationales of deterrence, retribution, and rehabilitation.
Punishment of the mentally ill does not promote the normal goal of punishment:
deterrence. The mentally ill offender is essentially undeterrable since he has little, if
any, moral culpability. And if the mental illness has caused loss of free will, the
offender has lost his ability to freely choose whether or not to recommit the offense,
and he is therefore undeterrable through punishment. 21 Additionally, punishment of the
mentally ill precludes the deterrence of others because sane would-be wrongdoers
cannot identify with the mentally ill who are punished and are therefore also not
deterred from committing a crime.
22
Punishment of the mentally ill also runs counter to the retributive theory of criminal
justice, which holds that it is only just to punish those defendants who "freely choose to
do wrong. ' '2 3 Since mentally ill offenders lack free will, they do not affirmatively
choose to commit a crime in the same way in which a sane offender decides to commit
a crime. Therefore, notions of equity and justice caution against using punishment in
the typical retributive way against these offenders.
Similar to the other two policy rationales of punishment, rehabilitation is also
inapplicable to mentally ill offenders. Mentally ill offenders do not suffer from a moral
defect that is subject to rehabilitation, but instead suffer from a mental disease that is in
need of medical treatment.24 Therefore, mentally ill offenders should be appropriately
placed in a secure medical institution,25 an approach which also addresses the public
concern that these offenders pose a threat to society.
C. Historical Development of the Insanity Defense
The insanity defense, existing since ancient times, 6 has undergone significant
changes. As the requirements for successfully raising the insanity defense increased
over time, the number of successful insanity pleas decreased. By the eighteenth
18. RITA J. SIMON & DAVID E. AARONSON, THE INSANITY DEFENSE: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT
OF LAW AND POLICY IN THE POST-HINCKLEY ERA 174 (1988).
19. Mickenberg, supra note 7, at 977 ("[T]he release of dangerous persons is antithetical to
the very nature of the insanity defense .. "); see also CRIMINAL JUSTICE? THE LEGAL SYSTEM
VERSUS INDIVIDUAL RESPONSIBILITY 146 (Robert James Bidinotto ed., 2d ed. 1995) [hereinafter
CRIMINAL JUSTICE] (postulating that the insanity defense exists "to make all of us feel safer").
20. Timothy S. Hall, Legal Fictions and Moral Reasoning: Capital Punishment and the
Mentally Retarded Defendant After Penry v. Johnson, 35 AKRON L. REv. 327, 331 (2002).
21. Renre Melangon, Note, Arizona's Insane Response to Insanity, 40 ARIz. L. REv. 287,
301 (1998).
22. Id.
23. Paul Butler, Judging a "Very Sick Man": Should the Insanity Defense Save Russell
Weston's Life?, LEGAL TIMEs, Aug. 3, 1998, at 24.
24. Mickenberg, supra note 7, at 959.
25. Arenella, supra note 15, at 273.
26. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
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century, defendants were required to show a complete lack of cognitive ability in order
to successfully raise the defense. 27 Jury instructions during this time stated that "no
man could be held responsible for an act committed while deprived of his reason. 28
After this time, modem insanity tests began to develop at common law. The first
modem insanity test, the M'Naghten Test, was developed in 1843 and is still used by
some courts today as a cognitive test of insanity. After the M'Naghten Test, courts
began to develop volitional tests of insanity, including the Irresistible Impulse Test and
the Durham Test. In 1962, the American Law Institute (ALI) created an insanity test
which took into account both cognitive and volitional ability. The current federal test
of insanity was created in 1984, largely in response to public outcry over insanity
acquittals at that time. Recent modifications of the insanity test have included the mens
rea approach and the guilty but mentally ill verdict (GBMI).
In 1843, the first modem insanity test resulted from the famous M'Naghten case.29
M'Naghten, suffering from schizophrenia, attempted to kill the British Prime Minister
but instead killed the Prime Minister's secretary.30 At trial, M'Naghten was acquitted
by reason of insanity. On appeal, the House of Lords devised the famous M'Naghten
Test.31 This purely cognitive test excuses a defendant suffering from "a defect of
reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the act he
was doing" or a defendant who "did not know he was doing what was wrong. ' ,32 A
defendant needs to establish only one of these elements for a successful insanity plea.
American courts used the M'Naghten Test as the test of insanity for the next century.
33
The Liberal Era of American criminal law, occurring during the 1960s and 1970s,
saw a dramatic increase in the scope and use of the insanity defense.34 Due to criticisms
of the perceived rigidness of the M'Naghten Test,35 courts adopted other insanity tests.
Many states turned to volitional tests of insanity, which were first articulated in the
mid-nineteenth century. One volitional test, known as the Irresistible Impulse Test,
excuses a defendant whose mental illness "so subverts his will as to destroy his free
agency by rendering him powerless to resist by reason of the duress of the disease. 36
27. Christopher Slobogin, The Integrationist Alternative to the Insanity Defense:
Reflections on the Exculpatory Scope of Mental Illness in the Wake of the Andrea Yates Trial,
30 AM. J. CRIM. L. 315, 317 (2003) (citing Justice Tracy's definition of an insane person in Rex
v. Arnold, 16 Ho.St.Tr. 764-65 (1724)).
28. Leslie A. Leatherwood, Sanity in Alaska: A Constitutional Assessment of the Insanity
Defense Statute, 10 ALAsKA L. REv. 65, 76 (1993) (citing the jury instructions of In re Clark, 1
City Hall Recorder 176, 177 (N.Y. 1816)).
29. Daniel M'Naghten's Case, (1843) 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (H.L.).
30. M'Naghten's Case, 8 Eng. Rep. at 719; Slobogin, supra note 27, at 317.
31. M'Naghten's Case, 8 Eng. Rep. at 722.
32. Id.
33. Melanqon, supra note 21, at 292.
34. See John Q. La Fond & Mary L. Durham, Cognitive Dissonance: Have Insanity
Defense and Civil Commitment Reforms Made a Difference?, 39 VILL. L. REV. 71, 74,77 (1994)
(noting that "courts in over half of the states adopted broader tests of insanity").
35. Slobogin, supra note 27, at 318; see also Paul H. Robinson, The Criminal-Civil
Distinction and Dangerous Blameless Offenders, 83 J. CRM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 693, 699
(1993) ("As early as 1887, the [M'Naghten Test] was criticized as failing to reflect the growing
understanding of human behavior.").
36. Parsons v. State, 2 So. 854, 866 (Ala. 1887) (emphasis in original); see also Robinson,
20061 1483
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This is a very narrow volitional test, since it requires total impairment of volitional
capacity.
37
Another broader more recently devised volitional test is the Durham Test,
articulated in 1954 by Judge David Bazelon in response to modem scientific
discoveries regarding insanity. 38 The Durham Test states that "an accused is not
criminally responsible if his unlawful act was the product of mental disease or mental
defect., 39 Due partly to its possibility for an expansive definition of insanity, the
Durham Test has since fallen out of favor.4°
In response to the ambiguities present in the Durham Test4 ' and the "single-minded
emphasis on the concept of right and wrong commonly associated with the M'Naghten
rule ' 42 in 1962, the ALI and Model Penal Code (MPC) developed a test containing
both cognitive and volitional prongs, combining the M'Naghten Test and the lT with
recent scientific knowledge.43 The ALI/MPC Test excuses a defendant who "as a result
of mental disease or defect ... lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the
criminality.., of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law."
44
By use of the words "substantial capacity," "appreciate," and "conform," the ALL/MPC
Test attempted to lessen the rigidness of previous insanity tests.45
During the 1980s, the American criminal justice system began a new era: the
Neoconservative Era.46 During this period, community safety was greatly emphasized,
at the expense of the individual rights of the mentally ill. 47 The popularity among the
public of the insanity defense dramatically decreased after the successful insanity plea
in 1982 by John W. Hinckley Jr., failed assassin of President Reagan,48 and efforts
were made to once again revise insanity tests to prevent similar acquittals in the future.
One such test was the current federal insanity test, devised in 1984,49 which requires a
"severe mental illness," rather than the previously less-stringent requirement of a
supra note 35, at 699.
37. Henry T. Miller, Recent Changes in Criminal Law: The Federal Insanity Defense, 46
LA. L. REv. 337, 344 (1985).
38. Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954); Melanqon, supra note 21, at
292
39. Durham, 214 F.2d at 874-75 (emphasis added).
40. SIMON & AARONSON, supra note 18, at 28 (attributing this decline to the test's
potentially broad application).
41. CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 19, at 145.
42. SIMON & AARONSON, supra note 18, at 39.
43. Id. at 38.
44. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01(1) (1962).
45. See Christine Michalopoulos, Note, Filling in the Holes of the Insanity Defense: The
Andrea Yates Case and the Need for a Volitional Prong, 10 VA. J. Soc. POL'Y & L. 383, 392,
395 (2003) (noting that the ALI/MPC's cognitive prong is less stringent than the M'Naghten
Test and the ALI/MPC's volitional prong is less stringent than the IIT).
46. La Fond & Durham, supra note 34, at 80.
47. Id. at81.
48. See Mickenberg, supra note 7, at 946-47 (noting the widespread public outrage
following the Hinckley trial: "ninety percent of the population favored doing away with the
insanity defense").
49. SIMON & AARONSON, supra note 18, at 47 ("The Hinckley verdict was unquestionably
the decisive influence on congressional modifications to the insanity defense.").
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"mental disease or defect., 50 This test removed the ALI/MPC's volitional prong in
favor of a total impairment cognitive prong,51 excusing a defendant who is "unable to
appreciate the nature and quality or wrongfulness of his acts. 52 The 1984 federal test
also shifted the burden of proving insanity from the prosecution to the defense.53
The ideology of the Neoconservative Era also prompted efforts to abolish the
insanity defense altogether. Between 1979 and 1983, three states (Idaho, Montana, and
Utah) abolished the insanity defense and adopted the mens rea approach.54 Under this
approach, evidence of insanity can only be introduced as a means to rebut the
prosecution's evidence of the mens rea element needed to prove the crime.
Another recent development in many jurisdictions is the adoption of the guilty but
mentally ill verdict to supplement, or in a few jurisdictions, to replace, the NGRI
verdict. The GBMI verdict is used when the offender's mental illness "did not impair
him severely enough to meet the legal definition of insanity." 55 Usually, the GBMI
defendant receives the normal prison sentence that would be given to a sane offender,
but is also given a medical evaluation and necessary treatment according to the state's
statutory procedures.
56
A recent review conducted in 2002 by the American Academy of Psychiatry and the
Law reported the type of insanity test used by each state. 57 The results of this study
reveal that 25 states use the M'Naghten Test, 58 17 states use the ALI/MPC Test, 59 4
states have abolished the insanity defense, 6° 3 states utilize the IIT,61 and 1 state uses
the Durham Test.
62
D. History of the Treatment of Mentally Ill Offenders
As the insanity defense evolved, so did the treatment of mentally ill offenders. In
comparing these two evolutions, this section reveals a correlation between the scope of
the insanity test used at the time and the level of treatment received. In short, the
50. Slobogin, supra note 27, at 318 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 20 (1984)).
51. Miller, supra note 37, at 350-51.
52. 18 U.S.C.S. § 17 (2004); see also Michalopoulos, supra note 45, at 390.
53. Butler, supra note 23.
54. Andrew M. Levine, Note, Denying the Settled Insanity Defense: Another Necessary
Step in Dealing with Drug and Alcohol Abuse, 78 B.U. L. REV. 75, 79 (1998).
55. Mickenberg, supra note 7, at 949-50; see, e.g., MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 768.36
(2000 & West Supp. 2005).
56. Robinson, supra note 35, at 701; see also RICHARD J. BONNIE, JOHN C. JEFFRIES &
PETER W. Low, A CASE STUDY IN THE INSANITY DEFENSE: THE TRIAL OF JOHN W. HINCKLEY, JR.
132 (2nd ed. 2000) ("The GBMI verdict is designed to facilitate psychiatric treatment of
mentally disordered offenders.").
57. Deborah Giorgi-Guarnieri et al, AAPL Practice Guideline for Forensic Psychiatric
Evaluation of Defendants Raising the Insanity Defense, 30 J. Am. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. S3,
2002.
58. Id. at S8.
59. Id. at S9.
60. Id. at S6.
61. Id. at S9.
62. Id. at S5.
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broader the scope of the insanity defense, the higher the level of treatment mentally ill
offenders received.
As the scope of the insanity defense increased during the 1960s and 1970s,63 a
simultaneous shift in the underlying focus on the goals of confinement also occurred.
This shift emphasized rehabilitation of mentally ill offenders, instead of punishment.
Many believed that scientific advances in mental health treatment would allow these
people to one day become productive members of society.64 Offenders were prescribed
anti-psychotic drugs, making them more amendable to treatment efforts. 65 De-
institutionalization of treatment efforts was simultaneously taking place, driven by the
belief that treatment was more effective if given in familiar community settings.
66
However, the emphasis on rehabilitation was abandoned during the narrowing of the
insanity defense in the 1980s. Citing lack of evidence showing the effectiveness of
rehabilitation, the "just deserts" model of punishment gained significant support among
the public and politicians.67 The primary goal was no longer rehabilitating mentally ill
offenders, but rather guaranteeing appropriate punitive punishment regardless of
mental illness. 68 Some states passed mandatory sentencing laws for serious crimes,
while other states reinstated the death penalty in order to ensure that mentally ill
offenders were placed and remained in prison.
69
II. PUBLIC MISCONCEPTIONS REGARDING THE INSANITY DEFENSE
The public receives a substantial amount of information regarding the insanity
defense from the media, and the portrayal is not always accurate. 70 This inaccuracy is
largely a result of high profile cases, which the public uses to form generalizations
about the insanity defense.
7
'
The media gave large amounts of attention to recent cases in which the defendant
has invoked the insanity defense, such as the Lee Boyd Malvo trial,72 the Andrea Yates
63. See supra text accompanying note 34.
64. La Fond & Durham, supra note 34, at 77.
65. Max Lindeman, Out of Sight. Out of Mind. The Transinstitutionalization of the
Mentally Ill, FORTUNE NEWS, Fall 2000, at 12.
66. Id.
67. La Fond & Durham, supra note 34, at 81; see, e.g., SIMON& AARONSON, supra note 18,
at 184 (noting that President Nixon "believed that the insanity defense allowed criminals to
escape punishment").
68. La Fond & Durham, supra note 34, at 82.
69. Lindeman, supra note 65 at 13-14.
70. See David B. Wexler, Redefining the Insanity Problem, 53 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 528,
544 (1985) (Drs. Henry Steadman and Joseph Cocozza concluded from their research that
"selective reporting is at the bottom of public misconceptions of the criminally insane.").
71. See, e.g., PERLIN, supra note 2, at 235 ("[S]o much of our insanity defense
jurisprudence is informed by sensational cases ... "); George L. Blau & Richard A. Pasewark,
Statutory Changes and the Insanity Defense: Seeking the Perfect Insane Person, 18 LAW &
PSYCHOL. REV. 69, 75 (1994) ("[Tlhe legislature's concentration is focused on a few dramatic
cases involving some heinous criminal act.").
72. See, e.g., Mike M. Ahlers, Jury Convicts Malvo of Sniper Murder, CABLE NEWS
NETwORK, Dec. 19, 2003, http://www.cnn.com/2003/LAW/12/18/sprj.dcsp.malvo.trial/
(illustrating the continual media coverage preceding and during the trial of Lee Boyd Malvo for
1486 [Vol. 81:1479
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trial,73 the Unabomber case,74 and the John Hinckley Jr. trial. These cases renewed
the insanity defense debate, 76 regardless of whether the defendant was actually
mentally ill 77 or whether the insanity plea was ultimately successful. 78
The widespread public belief that defendants frequently use the insanity defense to
avoid punishment79 is largely attributable to high profile cases and the attention the
media gives them. The public also believes that the availability of the insanity defense
will result in the opportunity for those faking mental illness to avoid punishment.
80
These inaccurate concerns are largely attributable to the public's suspicion of mental
illness due to its perceived "invisibility.",
81
Based on empirical studies, the insanity defense is not as frequently or successfully
used as many believe. According to the Virginia Department of Mental Health, Mental
Retardation, and Substance Abuse Services, only one percent of felony defendants
nationwide raise the insanity defense.82 The rate of these defendants successfully
the 2002 sniper shootings in the Washington D.C. area).
73. See, e.g., Slobogin, supra note 27, at 315 (describing the trial of Andrea Yates, charged
with drowning her five children in 2001, as a "tragic and controversial case").
74. See, e.g., Michael L. Perlin, "Where the Winds Hit Heavy on the Borderline": Mental
Disability Law, Theory and Practice, "US" and "Them", 31 Loy. L.A.L. REv. 775,777 (1998)
(referencing "the debate that raged recently over the Unabomber case, as reflected specifically in
the sub-debate over the relationship between mental illness and insanity").
75. See, e.g., Carolyn Alexander, Oregon's Psychiatric Security Review Board: Trouble in
Paradise, 22 LAW & PSYCHOL. REv. 1,5 (1998) (describing Hinckley's attempted assassination
of President Ronald Reagan as a "sensational crime[]"); see also supra note 48 and
accompanying text for further background of this trial.
76. See, e.g., id. at 6 ("Eighty percent of the reforms in the insanity defense between 1978
and 1990 occurred shortly after Hinckley's acquittal.").
77. See Michalopoulos, supra note 45, at 385 (noting that Yates had previously been
diagnosed with a major depressive disorder and had been prescribed an anti-psychotic drug used
for schizophrenia); see also Ahlers, supra note 72 (psychiatric testimony presented at trial
characterized Malvo as having dissociative disorder, causing him to be unable to distinguish
right from wrong).
78. See Slobogin, supra note 27, at 315 (Yates was originally convicted of murder by a jury
and sentenced to life in prison); Ahlers, supra note 72 (jury rejected Malvo's insanity defense
and found Malvo guilty of terrorism and capital murder). But cf Court Overturns Yates'
Convictions, CABLE NEWS NETWORK, Jan. 6, 2005, http://www.cnn.com/2005/LAW/01/06/
children.drowned/index.html (citing false testimony by a prosecution witness, the Texas First
Court of Appeals overturned Yates' convictions and ordered a new trial).
79. Marc Rosen, Note, Insanity Denied: Abolition of the Insanity Defense in Kansas, 8
KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 253, 258 (1999) (stating that one expert has found that "the general
public has the impression that the defense is used in 20% to 50% of all criminal cases"); see
also La Fond & Durham, supra note 34, at 92-93 (noting that this belief is held not only by the
general public, but also by "attorneys and judges, legislators, [and] mental health workers").
80. La Fond & Durham, supra note 34, at 92; see also Michael L. Perlin, "There's No
Success Like Failure/and Failure's No Success at All ": Exposing the Pretextuality of Kansas v.
Hendricks, 92 Nw. U. L. REv. 1247, 1259 (1998) ("The fear that defendants will 'fake' the
insanity defense to escape punishment continues to paralyze the legal system . .
81. PERLIN, supra note 2, at 247.
82. Siobhan Roth, Long Oddsfor Malvo on Insanity, LEGAL TIMES, Oct. 20,2003, at 1; see
also Blau & Pasewark, supra note 71, at 74 ("[I]n a study of forty-nine counties in eight states,
it was found that an average of .93% of defendants indicted for felonies employed the
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pleading the insanity defense is even lower-less than 0.002%.83 This low success rate
is partially due to the fact that there is little incentive to plead the insanity defense
unless the defendant is confident of its success. If the insanity plea is unsuccessful, the
defendant is unable to bargain for a reduced charge because an insanity plea is viewed
as an admission of committing the crime.
84
Beliefs regarding the abuse of the insanity defense also lack evidential support.85
Empirical evidence reveals that only a small number of defendants fake mental illness
in order to be acquitted; 86 in reality, offenders often deny mental illness.8 7 Mental
health professionals can usually discover this small percentage of defendants who fake
mental illness. Mental health doctors are between ninety-two and ninety-five percent
successful in determining whether a defendant is faking mental illness,88 making abuse
of the insanity defense unlikely in reality.
III. JUSTIFIED PUBLIC CONCERNS AND THE REAL PROBLEMS OF THE SYSTEM
Despite the persistence of public misconceptions regarding the frequency and
success of insanity pleas, some justified concerns exist. These concerns, coupled with
the fact that mentally ill offenders comprise a significant portion of the criminal justice
system,89 warrant a renewed examination of the insanity defense. The most significant
concerns involve the anti-therapeutic nature of the criminal justice system's treatment
of the mentally ill, which hinders the achievement of the policy goals of the insanity
defense.
defense.").
83. See Grant H. Morris, Placed in Purgatory: Conditional Release of Insanity Acquittees,
39 ARiz. L. REv. 1061, 1063 (1997) (noting studies have concluded that "for every 1000 felony
cases, insanity is pleaded in approximately nine cases and is successful in only two").
84. La Fond & Durham, supra note 34, at 95.
85. Mickenberg, supra note 7, at 981 (stating that "the most vociferous opponents of the
insanity defense are usually unable to cite actual examples of defendants who escaped justice by
pretending to be mentally ill").
86. Perlin, supra note 80, at 1259 (stating that the number of cases in which defendants
fake mental illness is "minuscule"); see also Mickenberg, supra note 7, at 981 ("[S]tudies
indicat[e] that eighty percent of those defendants found NGRI had been previously hospitalized
for mental illness ....").
87. PERLIN, supra note 2, at 66 n.264.
88. Rosen, supra note 79, at 259 (citing David Schretlen & Hal Arkowitz, A Psychological
Test Battery to Detect Prison Inmates Who Fake Insanity or Mental Retardation, 8 BEHAV. SCI.
& L. 75 (1990) (detailing two doctors' group study of one hundred men that sought to determine
the accuracy of a test battery in detecting individuals faking mental illness)).
89. See Alexander, supra note 75, at 4, 30-31 (noting that "mentally ill criminal defendants
are a significant sector of the criminal justice system," since "individuals with psychiatric
impairment were disproportionately represented among individuals charged with a crime")
(emphasis added); see also Byers, supra note 14, at 520 ("Today's evidence reveals that the
problem posed by mentally ill offenders goes beyond the narrow question of how many raise the
defense .... "); Louisa Van Wezel Schwartz Symposium on Mental Health Issues in
Correctional Institutions: Symposium Introduction, 7 UDC L. REv. 111, 115 (2003) (citing
Bureau of Justice Statistics "showing that 16% of all persons in the criminal justice system have
serious mental disorders").
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A. The Current System of Treatment
Mentally ill offenders do not receive the most beneficial rehabilitative treatment
available. The current system of treatment is best described as "anti-therapeutic." 9°
This characterization is supported by the President's New Freedom Commission on
Mental Health's 2003 Final Report, which states that "[m]any people with serious
mental illnesses ... remain ... housed in institutions, jails, or juvenile detention
centers. These individuals are unable to participate in their own communities." 91
Studies documenting the harshness of mentally ill offenders' prison sentences state
that because of the perception that mentally ill offenders are more dangerous than sane
offenders, mentally ill offenders receiving prison sentences often serve longer
sentences than similarly situated sane offenders. 92 While serving prison sentences,
mentally ill offenders usually receive little, if any, rehabilitative treatment, but instead
are targets of abuse and cruelty by sane offenders.93 Due to the unavailability of
adequate mental health treatment, mentally ill offenders are sent to the penitentiary or
state correctional facility to serve their sentence among the general prison population.
94
At the end of their prison sentence, mentally ill offenders are often still dangerous
when they return to society because they have not received psychiatric treatment in
prison.9 5 Unlike the danger posed by sane offenders returning to society after serving
their sentences, the cause of the danger posed by mentally ill offenders could have been
medically treated during their sentences.
B. Failure to Achieve the Policy Goals of the Insanity Defense
Although the public routinely misconceives the insanity defense, some public
concerns, particularly those involving the treatment of mentally ill offenders, remain
justified96 but have often been ignored.97 The public's real concern regarding the
90. Michael L. Perlin, "For the Misdemeanor Outlaw": The Impact of the ADA on the
Institutionalization of Criminal Defendants with Mental Disabilities ", 52 ALA. L. REv. 193,237
(2000).
91. THE PRESIDENT'S NEW FREEDOM COMMISSION ON MENTAL HEALTH FINAL REPORT 28
(2003), available at http://mentalhealthcommission.gov/reports/FinaReport/downloads/
FinalReport.pdf.
92. See Amy Watson, Patricia Hanrahan, Daniel Luchins & Arthur Lurigio, Mental Health
Courts and the Complex Issue of Mentally Ill Offenders, American Psychiatric Association
(2001), available at http://ps.psychiatryonline.org/cgi/content/full/52/4/477 (citing a survey by
the Bureau of Justice Statistics which revealed that "mentally ill state prison inmates were
sentenced to prison terms 12 months longer on average that those of other offenders") (emphasis
added).
93. Byers, supra note 14, at 518 ("[J]als... function as psychiatric inpatient institutions
where... [mentally ill inmates] are 'targets of cruel manipulation and of physical and sexual
abuse' and whose 'bizarre behavior ... can get them punished."').
94. Alexander, supra note 75, at 10.
95. Id. (stating that mentally ill offenders are "incarcerated in state institutions without
treatment and released into the community on parole or discharge").
96. Morris, supra note 83, at 1111 ("The public demands, and is entitled to receive,
protection from those who commit criminal acts but who escape criminal responsibility.").
97. Wexler, supra note 70, at 531 ("[T]he reformers... rarely paused to consider the real
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insanity defense is not based on the issue of blameworthiness, but rather it is centered
around the issue of at what time the mentally ill are released back into society.98 Many
question whether "treatment for dangerous mental illness is effective" or whether
"dangerous mentally ill people can get better."99 The mentally ill, a group for which we
cannot insure that the goals of punishment are carried out,1° ° are ineffectively being
punished since they are not receiving potentially beneficial mental health treatment.
While being punished, the proper placement of those offenders posing a threat to
society in a psychiatric treatment facility is not guaranteed in all cases.
A main policy rationale of the insanity defense (as well as the criminal justice
system in general)101 is the assurance that dangerous mentally ill offenders do not pose
a threat to society. The best way to accomplish this policy rationale is the restraint of
mentally ill offenders in rehabilitative facilities, in which the offender is released, and
subsequently monitored, only upon a satisfactory mental health examination.'°2 Early
release of the mentally ill from prison on parole or from a treatment facility before
adequate treatment is received not only poses a threat to society, 0 3 but also "rob[s] [the
offender] of needed psychiatric treatment."' t 4 Furthermore, early release weakens the
public's confidence in the legal system's ability to protect society from harmful
individuals.05
Even when mentally ill offenders are placed in psychiatric treatment facilities,
treatment is not used to rehabilitate the offender; the treatment facility merely
resembles a "de facto prison.''' 6 Treatment is used more as a punitive tool than as a
rehabilitative tool. 107 Despite the fact that even Congress noted the inappropriateness
of retributive punishment, the impairment of the offender's volitional control is often
roots of public dissatisfaction.").
98. James E. Ellis, The Consequences of the Insanity Defense: Proposals to Reform Post-
Acquittal Commitment Laws, 35 CAT-. U. L. REV. 961,962 (1986); see also Phillip E. Johnson,
Book Review, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 1534, 1548 (1983) (reviewing NORVAL MORRIS, MADNESS AND
THE CRIMINAL LAW (1983)) ("[T]he public will tolerate insanity acquittals only if it is convinced
that 'dangerous' defendants are locked away through a commitment procedure.").
99. Morris, supra note 83, at 1062.
100. See supra text accompanying note 20.
101. United States v. Lyons, 731 F.2d 243, 246 (5th Cir. 1984).
102. See, e.g., Morris, supra note 83, at 1111 ("Protection is assured by hospitalizing
insanity acquittees until they are no longer dangerous and by monitoring them as they move
from hospitalization to community living.").
103. See, e.g., Leatherwood, supra note 28, at 66 (providing an example of a NGRI
acquittee: "Charles Meach, a patient on release from the Alaska Psychiatric Institute, murdered
four teenagers.").
104. Perlin, supra note 74, at 785.
105. Arenella, supra note 15, at 279.
106. See Perlin, supra note 80, at 1248-49, 1269 (noting that the United States Supreme
Court holding in Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997) "upholding a state law sanctioning
long-term institutionalization of 'sexually violent predators"' shows that a majority of the Court
"is comfortable with a statutory scheme that has the potential of transforming psychiatric
treatment facilities into de facto prisons and that uses mental health treatment as a form of social
control...").
107. See Jonas Robitscher & Andrew Ky Haynes, In Defense of the Insanity Defense, 31
EMORY L.J. 9, 35 (1982) (noting that according to Professors Goldstein and Katz, "the insanity
defense, while ostensibly designed to reach a therapeutic result, actually was more punitive than
traditional punishment methods").
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disregarded for purposes of punishment. l0 Some psychiatrists recognize the highly
punitive nature of the treatment being received, calling the commitment of offenders
"America's newest form of slavery."' 1 9 Many judges then propagate these views by
punitively basing their decisions on stereotypical views that the mentally ill are
incompetent and do not exercise enough self-restraint," 0 thus continuing the
deficiencies present in the insanity defense system.
IV. APPROPRIATE SOLUTIONS TO IMPROVE THE INSANITY DEFENSE SYSTEM
The current insanity defense system must be improved in order to appropriately
address its deficiencies and the justified public concerns. Two improvements can
substantially impact the current system: the adoption of a guilty-except-for-insanity
(GEI) verdict and the creation of a mental health sentencing board to determine the
treatment of offenders found by a jury to be GEl. When combined, these two solutions
will constitutionally ensure that mentally ill offenders are sentenced appropriately and
receive the treatment necessary for them to return to society as productive members.
A. Adoption of a GEl Verdict
Presently, there is no uniform insanity test used across the nation. Although the
1984 federal test is used by all federal courts, state courts use different verdicts
employing varying insanity tests,"' all of which have displayed flaws upon
implementation. The resulting increase in uniformity of insanity determinations as
more states adopt the insanity standard this Note recommends would have two benefits.
First, notions of equity and justice will be enhanced, since similar offenders will be
treated in the same manner. Second,, since an insanity determination serves as a
prerequisite to receiving an effective treatment as part of the sentence, more offenders
in need of this treatment will be given the opportunity.
The superior insanity standard that should be adopted is based on Oregon's GEl
verdict. Determination of insanity under this standard asks whether "as a result of
mental disease or defect at the time of engaging in criminal conduct, the person lacks
substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality of the conduct or to conform
the conduct to the requirements of the law."''12 Under this insanity test, defendants
would be found guilty of commission of the underlying crime except for insanity if
they were unable to conform their conduct to the law (volitional impairment) or
appreciate the criminality of their conduct (cognitive impairment) due to a mental
illness or defect present at the time of the offense. By taking into account both the
108. See, e.g., Byers, supra note 14, at 516 (noting that Congress "acknowledged the
relevance of volitional control to the aims of punishment .... [but] firmly rejected a test
acknowledging the impact of mental illness on volition and therefore on culpability").
109. Robitscher & Haynes, supra note 107, at 40-41 (discussing the views of psychiatrist
Thomas Szasz).
110. Michael L. Perlin, A Law of Healing, 68 U. CN. L. REv. 407,420 (2000) (noting that
"[c]ourts often appear impatient with mentally disabled litigants, ascribing their problems with
the legal process to weak character or poor resolve").
111. See supra Part I.C.
112. OR. REV. STAT. § 161.295(1) (2003).
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volitional and cognitive abilities of the offender, the GEI verdict avoids the flaws of
exclusively cognitive or volitional insanity tests." 13 The GEI verdict appropriately takes
into consideration offenders with volitional incapacities that are amenable to treatment
in mental health facilities" 4 as well as offenders with cognitive incapacities.
Additionally, the GEI verdict does not unnecessarily narrow the definition of insanity,
thereby forcing the criminal justice system to ignore blameworthiness in order to
protect society. 15 The GEI verdict supports the premises underlying both the criminal
justice system and the insanity defense. The basic requirement of criminal
responsibility, free will, is not disregarded. The policy goals of the insanity defense are
furthered because there is a greater probability that the offender will receive
rehabilitative treatment through a finding of GE than through a finding under another
insanity standard resulting in a strictly punitive prison sentence" 16
1. Why Other Methods of Determining Insanity Are Flawed
The GEI verdict is a solution to the problems inherent in other methods of
determining insanity. Criticisms involving exclusive use of cognitive or volitional
determinations of insanity led to the creation of alternative methods of insanity
determination. Since these other methods also revealed various flaws, they should
similarly be characterized as inappropriate. Except for the GBMI alternative, these
insanity tests lead juries to inaccurately find mentally ill offenders insane and thus
acquit them. Mentally ill offenders usually return to society upon acquittal, without
receiving any treatment. Alternatively, these insanity tests do not accurately identify
mentally ill offenders, but instead treat these offenders as sane offenders and sentence
them to a regular prison term with no mental health treatment. This scenario also
results in mentally ill offenders returning to society after serving their sentences
without receiving any treatment.
In addition to the fact that volitional tests 17 of insanity often result in an acquittal
and no mandatory treatment for mentally ill offenders, other arguments claim that
strictly volitional tests do not accurately determine insanity. The volitional test for
insanity fails to properly distinguish between mentally ill offenders and blameworthy
offenders capable of free will and instead "creates a huge potential for chaos in the
culpability-based criminal justice system we have today."1 8 This chaos results because
volitional tests for insanity disregard the existence of the offender's free will, which is
113. See, e.g., Leatherwood, supra note 28, at 85 (concluding that Alaska's insanity test is
inadequate until both the cognitive and volitional abilities of the offender are taken into
account).
114. PERLIN, supra note 2, at 430.
115. Cf. Robinson, supra note 35, at 706 (critiquing the abolitionist approach and deletion of
the volitional prong: "[t]he criminal justice system is modified as necessary to protect us from
the dangerous offenders that the civil system does not, without regard to the offender's
blameworthiness").
116. See, e.g., Melangon, supra note 21, at 316 (noting that Arizona's GEl verdict system
"continue[s] to recognize that a person judged legally insane is not responsible for his action
and therefore should not be punished").
117. See supra text accompanying notes 36, 39.
118. Slobogin, supra note 27, at 323.
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a prerequisite for criminal responsibility. Offenders asserting volitional insanity pleas
based on predisposition or subjective urge are "asserting simply that their criminal
behavior is driven by factors outside their control," not that they lacked the free will
upon which to commit the act. 19 Therefore, mentally ill offenders capable of
exercising free will are often incorrectly found to be insane, and thus acquitted.
Criticisms of the exclusive use of cognitive ability to determine insanity have
focused primarily on the inadequacies of the M'Naghten Test. The M'Naghten Test's
analysis of cognitive ability usually reduces the fact-finder's inquiry into whether the
actor was aware of his conduct, but it fails to take into account other relevant factors
such as "the existence or classification of the mental defect" and volitional abilities,
such as the "actor's ability to will, control, or appreciate the consequences of his
acts."120 Offenders found to have the cognitive ability to understand that their conduct
was wrong are found guilty, despite other mental impairments that may exist.'
2
'
Psychiatric research subsequent to the creation of the M'Naghten Test revealed that the
unconscious mind plays a significant role in a person's actions, 22 illustrating that
cognitive ability alone does not control one's actions. Therefore, exclusive use of
cognitive ability to determine insanity may also disregard the existence of free will
because cognitive tests do not recognize the role of the unconscious mind.
The GBMI verdict 23 is flawed largely because in practice it has not accomplished
its theoretical goal: assurance of treatment opportunity.124 Since courts may impose a
prison sentence following a GBMI verdict, these offenders often have no greater
chance of receiving treatment than other mentally ill offenders serving regular prison
sentences.125 Additionally, evidence reveals that GBMI offenders are more likely than
sane offenders to go to prison and to receive longer sentences for the same offense.'
26
Therefore, GBMI verdict systems further precipitate the justified public concern
caused by releasing mentally ill offenders back into society without receiving sufficient
mental health treatment.
The abolitionist approach/mens rea approach 27 is also flawed, even though initial
constitutional due process objections to this approach appear to be unfounded. 28
119. Id. at321.
120. Byers, supra note 14, at 482.
121. See, e.g., People v. Phillips, 83 Cal. App. 4th 170 (Ct. App. 2000) (finding the
defendant guilty of second degree robbery of a convenience store because he know what he was
doing was wrong, despite the fact that he was mentally retarded and brain injured from a
previous gunshot wound).
122. CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 19, at 143 ("The unconscious mind was a powerful, if
hidden, influence on behavior.").
123. See supra text accompanying note 55.
124. See supra text accompanying note 56.
125. Plaut, supra note 11, at 437 (stating that the Illinois GBMI statute provides that "[t]he
Department of Corrections shall provide such special psychiatric, psychological, or other
counseling and treatment for the defendant as it determines necessary") (emphasis in original).
126. La Fond & Durham, supra note 34, at 103. See generally BoNNiEETAL., supra note 56,
at 132 (noting that "the actual impact of the GBMI procedure on the sentencing and correctional
process may be slight").
127. See supra text accompanying note 54.
128. See Paul E. Antill, Comment, Unequal Protection? Juvenile Justice and the Insanity
Defense, 22 J. Juv. L. 50,54 (2001) ("[I]t was 'highly doubtful that due process requires a State
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Despite the substantial decline in the number of acquittals based on the insanity
defense following the adoption of this approach, 129 other stages of the system are
affected. Empirical evidence reveals that defining the scope of mental illness too
narrowly results in an increase in dismissals based on incompetency to stand trial.' 30
Additionally, since even severe mental illness rarely negates the required mens rea, the
mens rea approach serves little practical use for mentally ill offenders. 13' For example,
an offender previously diagnosed with a mental disorder who commits a crime in
response to a belief that he would "metamorphos[e] into a new level of existence" will
be found guilty, since he intended to commit the crime despite his troubled belief. 132
Since the scope of mental illness is narrowly defined, the criminal justice system is no
longer capable of accurately distinguishing between those who are blameworthy and
those who do not deserve punishment. 133 Furthermore, the unavailability of an insanity
defense will increase justified public concerns raised by the release of mentally ill
offenders back into society after serving their prison sentences without receiving any
psychiatric treatment. 134
The ALI/MPC Test provides the closest resemblance to a GEl verdict, because it
takes both cognitive and volitional abilities into consideration.1 35 Even though it
receives a substantial amount of support from the courts, this test is flawed in actual
application. Despite inclusion of the words "substantial" and "appreciate" to broaden
the definition of insanity, it is difficult for fact finders to actually apply this broadened
test as articulated.
136
2. Constitutionality of a GEI Verdict
The proposed system for issuing GEl verdicts would dispel any Sixth Amendment
challenges that may arise. The Sixth Amendment right to a trial by jury applies to the
to make available an insanity defense to a criminal defendant."' (quoting Ake v. Oklahoma, 470
U.S. 68, 191 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting))).
129. See, e.g., Slobogin, supra note 27, at 339 ("In the state of Montana before the Mens
Rea Alternative was adopted, about 23% of all mental state defenses succeeded. After the
adoption of the Mens Rea Alternative, only 2.3% of those who asserted mental state defenses
prevailed.").
130. Id. at 340.
131. See Rosen, supra note 79, at 261 ("A defendant can be both insane and capable of
having the requisite intent; the two concepts are not mutually exclusive."); see also Catherine E.
Lilly, Recent Development, State v. Herrera: The Utah Supreme Court Rules in Favor of Utah's
Controversial Insanity Defense Statute, 22 J. CONTEMP. L. 221,237 (1996) (stating that the mens
rea approach creates an impractical system based on the delusions of each defendant).
132. State v. Bethel, 66 P.3d 840, 843 (Kan. 2003) (finding that the defendant, previously
diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia, killed his father as God instructed him to do and was
guilty of murder).
133. See Leatherwood, supra note 28, at 82 ("'The issue of criminal blameworthiness merits
deeper inquiry [than whether the defendant harbored the requisite mens rea for the
offense] ....' (quoting State v. Searcy, 798 P.2d 914, 935 (Idaho 1990) (McDevitt, J.,
dissenting))); Levine, supra note 54, at 95 (claiming that the insanity defense is necessary to
allow the criminal justice system to determine when punishment is justified).
134. See Philips, supra note 15, at 170.
135. See supra text accompanying note 44 (providing an articulation of the ALI/MPC Test).
136. Michalopoulos, supra note 45, at 393.
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determination of guilt or innocence.137 This right guarantees that a criminal defendant's
guilt will be determined by a lay jury of his peers.
Under the proposed system, a lay jury would be given complete authority to issue
GEl verdicts to mentally ill offenders. Once the jurors hear all the evidence and facts
regarding the defendant's insanity plea during the guilt phase of the trial, they would be
able to issue a GEl verdict. Issuance of a GEl verdict would signify that the jury
acknowledges that the defendant is technically guilty of the commission of the offense,
but should not be held to the same degree of criminal responsibility as a similarly
situated sane offender. After issuing a GEI verdict, the jury would also determine the
offender's sentencing range. This sentence determination by the jury would ensure
fairness, since the sentencing range would be based on the facts and evidence presented
at trial. Therefore, because a lay jury would be deciding whether to hold the offender
GEl at the conclusion of the guilt phase of the trial, the offender's Sixth Amendment
rights would be guaranteed.
3. Benefits of Adopting the GE Verdict
Every state should look at and consider adopting the GEI verdict. As previously
stated, all other insanity tests currently in use by one or more states are flawed. The
GE verdict is a superior approach to these flawed insanity standards. Thus, one
practical benefit of widespread adoption of the GEI verdict is the assurance of greater
uniformity in the ultimate result of insanity determinations, which presently does not
exist even among jurisdictions that use the same insanity rule. 13 Offenders in need of
medical treatment would be appropriately found to be GEI, rather than being sentenced
to prison without receiving any treatment or being acquitted by reason of insanity.
An increasingly popular alternative utilized in many criminal justice systems is
mental health courts, which typically hear only cases of nonviolent offenders.
39
Because a jury is not present, these courts face potential violations of the Sixth
Amendment right to trial by jury unless the offender accepts transfer to a mental health
court, thereby waiving his right to a trial by jury.140 Additionally, since an offender
must waive his right to a trial by jury, not all offenders in need of treatment will
necessarily affirmatively choose to be tried in a mental health court. Because a jury
137. U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial,
by an impartial jury of the State"); Kimberly Tibbetts, Case Note, Qualified to Convict: State v.
Griffin and the Constitutionality of Death-Qualified Juries in Connecticut, 22 QUINNIPIAc L.
REv. 359, 386 (2003).
138. See, e.g., Blau & Pasewark, supra note 71, at 86 (noting that studies have indicated
differing rates of NGRI pleas throughout counties in Wyoming and differing rates of NGRI
acquittals in New York).
139. Bernstein & Seltzer, supra note 3, at 148, 150 (noting that mental health courts,
composed of a judge and attorneys with training in mental illness, typically hear only cases of
nonviolent offenders charged with minor offenses); see also Mentally Ill Offender Treatment
and Crime Reduction Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-414, § 3, 118 Stat. 2327 (promoting mental
health court systems).
140. See Bernstein & Seltzer, supra note 3, at 150 ("It is crucial from the outset that transfer
to the mental health court be voluntary. Otherwise, singling out defendants with mental illnesses
... would likely violate the 6th Amendment right to a trial by jury.").
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determines the offender's guilt in the system proposed by this Note, however, this
system would not face the potential constitutional violations of mental health courts.
Receipt of proper treatment would not be dependent on the offender's affirmative
choice to utilize this sentencing system.
B. Creation of a Mental Health Sentencing Board
In addition to adoption of a GE verdict, the criminal justice system also needs
"back-end" reforms that deal with the treatment and monitoring of mentally ill
offenders.' 4 1 Since the criminal justice system's current treatment of mentally ill
offenders is anti-therapeutic, 142 a system of therapeutic jurisprudence should be
adopted to ensure appropriate treatment.
43
Economically, the long-term savings to society from a system of therapeutic
jurisprudence would outweigh the initial costs of increased treatment. This system
would help decrease the enormous costs to society that the correctional system
currently poses' 44 by reducing the recidivism rates of mentally ill offenders. Society's
tax dollars would be used more productively for treatment initially, rather than for
repeat incarceration of untreated mentally ill offenders. 45 The system would divert
funds currently used to ineffectively house mentally ill offenders in the correctional
system by ensuring that mentally ill offenders initially receive proper treatment so that
they will not continue to remain a financial burden to society.
Therapeutic jurisprudence offers an avenue to transform the way the criminal justice
system deals with mentally ill offenders from a system rooted in stereotypical bias
141. See La Fond & Durham, supra note 34, at 103-04 (noting that "front-end reforms,"
such as modifications of the test for insanity, "have not significantly reduced the number of
pleas or the number of defendants 'excused' for their crimes"); Philips, supra note 15, at 182
(concluding that "[i]nstead of changing the test for legal sanity or modifying the burden of
proof, the legislature would be well advised to consider higher standards for release of those
found 'not guilty by reason of insanity"').
142. See supra text accompanying note 90.
143. See Perlin, supra note 110, at 431 (concluding that "therapeutic jurisprudence is an
absolutely essential tool for the reconstruction of mental disability law").
144. See, e.g., U.S. Department of Justice Bureau Statistics, Prisoners in 2004,
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/abstract/p04.htm (last visited Nov. 6,2005) ("The Nation's prison
population grew 1.9% in 2004, reaching 1.5 million inmates."); U.S. Department of Justice
Statistics, State Prison Expenditures, 2001, http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/abstract/spe0l.htm
(last visited Nov. 6, 2005) ("[P]rison expenditures increased 150% from $11.7 billion [in FY
1986] to $29.5 billion [in FY 2001].").
145. Bernstein & Seltzer, supra note 3, at 161. For example, according to the preliminary
figures from a 2006 Internal Study by the Oregon Department of Corrections Research and
Evaluation Unit, the average daily cost per inmate in Oregon is $67.53. Depending on the level
of mental health treatment needed by the offender, this average cost increases by only $2.51
daily for an offender needing moderate mental health treatment. Even the cost of treating an
offender needing the highest mental health treatment in the general prison population ($9.14 per
day) is significantly less than the cost of reincarcerating an offender ($67.53 per day) who did
not initially receive proper mental health treatment while previously incarcerated. These small
additional costs in the short-term outweigh the overall costs that will result in the long-term if
the mental illnesses of these prisoners are not properly treated.
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against the mentally ill to a system that preserves due process principles, while also
focusing on healing.146 Implementation of a therapeutic jurisprudence system is most
effectively accomplished by creating a mental health sentencing board, which would
determine the sentencing and treatment of offenders found by a jury to be GEL
1. The Composition and Role of the Mental Health Sentencing Board
A mental health sentencing board, a variation of Oregon's Psychiatric Security
Review Board, 14 7 would be used to implement this superior system of therapeutic
jurisprudence. The mental health sentencing board would determine both the
appropriate sentencing scheme and treatment of each offender that is found GEI, as
well as monitor the offender's treatment. Under Oregon's system, the trial judge must
affirmatively grant custody of an insanity acquittee to the review board upon a
determination that the individual's mental condition still exists.148 The review board
consists of "a psychiatrist, a licensed clinical psychologist, an attorney, a parole and
probation representative, and a lay citizen."149 Once custody of the offender is granted,
the board evaluates the individual and monitors the treatment for a period of time that
is not to extend beyond the maximum sentence the offender would have faced upon
conviction. 1
50
The proposed mental health sentencing board would have a composition similar to
Oregon's Board, consisting minimally of a psychologist, a psychiatrist, and a law
enforcement officer. Unlike Oregon's system, the mental health sentencing board
proposed by this Note would be part of the judicial system and automatically receive
jurisdiction over every offender found GEl by a jury. Once granted custody, the mental
health sentencing board would determine the appropriate treatment and sentencing
scheme for the offender within the sentence range determined by the jury. The mental
health sentencing board would be bound only by the outer limits of the jury's sentence
and thus would be free to adopt any appropriate sentence within these limits that is
based on facts found by the jury. This provides the mental health sentencing board the
ability to determine an appropriate sentence based on their mental health knowledge
and law enforcement experience.
Similar to the monitoring essential in Oregon's system, the mental health sentencing
board would be given continual monitoring authority over each GEl offender. Once
eligible for parole (according to the jury's sentence), an offender could be released
conditionally or outright, based upon a finding of successful treatment by mental health
and law enforcement personnel. Upon conditional release, the mental health sentencing
146. Perlin, supra note 110; see also Perlin, supra note 74, at 784 (referencing the work of
Professors Stephen Behnke and Elyn Saks, which considers the ways the law "can promote the
mental health and well-being of individuals who struggle with significant psychological and
behavioral difficulties") (footnote omitted).
147. See OR. REv. STAT. § 161.327 (2004); see also CONN. GEN. STAT. § 17a-581 (2004)
(modeled after Oregon's statute); Alexander, supra note 75, at 2 (Oregon's Board is a state
agency within the Department of Administrative Services).
148. Blau & Pasewark, supra note 71, at 103.
149. Alexander, supra note 75, at 11.
150. Blau & Pasewark, supra note 71, at 103--04 (noting that Oregon's Board retains
monitoring authority over each offender).
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board would have supervisory authority over the monitoring and any required
outpatient treatment of the offender. In Oregon, a similar conditional release program
has yielded positive results, with low recidivism rates among conditionally released
offenders: "only six of 126 conditionally released patients (4.8%) were charged with
new crimes .... In all six cases, the charges were dismissed .... 151
2. Validity of a Mental Health Sentencing Board System
The Sixth Amendment right to a trial by jury ensures that every accused person be
given the right "to have the jury pass upon every substantive fact going to the question
of guilt or innocence."'' 52 The United States Supreme Court has recently addressed this
right, specifically in the context of findings that affect sentencing, beginning with
Apprendi v. United States in 2000. 153 When applied to the insanity context, this line of
case law establishes the validity of the proposed mental health sentencing board.
The Apprendi Court held that "any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond
the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a
reasonable doubt. ' m The Court distinguished between facts affecting punishment that
are presented during the guilt phase of the trial to the jury with facts that come to light
only after the jury verdict. 15 5 Facts cannot be presented after the jury verdict which
would "alter[] the maximum penalty for the crime committed [or] create[] a separate
offense calling for a separate penalty,"' 156 since these are considered elements of the
crime that must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
Two years later in Harris v. United States,'57 the Court distinguished its holding in
Apprendi by finding that the statutory provision at issue in Harris'58 did not violate the
defendant's constitutional rights since it only allowed the judge to increase the
defendant's minimum sentence. 59 The Court reasoned that the type of judicial fact-
finding authorized by the statute at issue in this case,"U]udicial factfinding in the
course of selecting a sentence within the authorized range,"'16 "is by definition not
'essential' to the defendant's punishment"' 16 1 and therefore does not need to be proven
beyond a reasonable doubt to the jury. In the same year, the Court held in Ring v.
Arizona that determination by a trial judge of aggravating factors for imposition of the
151. Morris, supra note 83, at 1070.
152. Robitscher & Haynes, supra note 107, at 52 (quoting State v. Strasberg, 110 P. 1020,
1022 (1910)).
153. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
154. Id. at 490 (emphasis added).
155. See id. at 482-83.
156. Id. at 486 (quoting McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 87-88 (1986)).
157. 536 U.S. 545 (2002).
158. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(2000) ("[A]ny person who, during and in relation to any
crime of violence or drug trafficking crime... shall, in addition to the punishment provided for
such crime of violence or drug trafficking crime... (i) be sentenced to a term of imprisonment
of not less than 5 years; (ii) if the firearm is brandished, be sentenced to a term of imprisonment
of not less than 7 years; and (iii) if the firearm is discharged, be sentenced to a term of
imprisonment of not less than 10 years.").
159. 536 U.S. at 568.
160. Id. at 558 (emphasis added).
161. Id. at 561.
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death penalty for a defendant convicted of first-degree murder was unconstitutional
because the aggravating factors increased the defendant's sentence.1
62
In holding that the trial court's imposition of an exceptional sentence exceeding the
maximum jury sentence was unconstitutional, the Court in Blakely v. Washington1
63
provided further definition of Apprendi's "statutory maximum." The Court clarified
that the statutory maximum is the maximum sentence that can be imposed "solely on
the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant."'164
Most recently, the Court held in United States v. Booker 165 that trial judges are
prohibited from holding a post-trial sentencing proceeding which results in a sentence
exceeding the maximum amount allowable based only on the findings presented to the
jury.166 The Court stated that the rationales of Apprendi and Blakely applied in this
case to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, thus requiring juries, rather than judges, to
make findings affecting sentencing maximums.
1 67
The Court's main focus in this line of case law was on the effect of the finding:
"[D]oes the required finding expose the defendant to a greater punishment than that
authorized by the jury's guilty verdict,"'168 thereby violating the defendant's Sixth
Amendment rights? 69 The Court was concerned that sentencing power would be taken
away from the jury and sentences would be based on facts that were not presented
during the guilt-phase of the trial. This would create a separate punishment phase of the
trial in violation of the Sixth Amendment.
Based on the Court's articulated concerns and rationale, the proposed mental health
sentencing board would be constitutional. A lay jury guaranteeing the offender's Sixth
Amendment rights would hear all the facts and evidence relating to the offender's
insanity plea during the trial. After hearing this evidence, the jury would decide
whether to issue a GEI verdict and an accompanying mandatory minimum and
maximum sentence. The mental health sentencing board would be bound by this
authorized sentencing range as well as the facts proven to the jury beyond a reasonable
doubt when determining the offender's sentencing scheme and treatment. The mental
health sentencing board would not have the authority to deviate from the outer
boundaries of the jury's prescribed sentence, so this system would be free from the
problems held to be unconstitutional by the Court in the Apprendi line of cases.
Although there is no way to empirically test the effectiveness of this proposed
system, Oregon's similar system for insanity acquittees has already received high
amounts of praise.170 These remarks have been particularly directed at the system's
ability to maintain a balance between addressing justified public concerns regarding
162. 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
163. 542 U.S. 296 (2004).
164. Id. at 303 (emphasis in original).
165. 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
166. Id. at 226-27.
167. Id. at 243-44.
168. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 494.
169. See also Ring, 536 U.S. at 602 ("The dispositive question, we said, 'is one not of form,
but of effect."') (quoting Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 494).
170. See, e.g., CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 19, at 151 ("The [American Psychiatric
Association] suggests conditional release, or parole, when there is 'a coherent and well
structured plan of supervision, management, and treatment' available .... ).
149920061
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
dangerous mentally ill offenders 71 and ensuring mentally ill offenders' constitutional
rights.'72
Unlike mental health courts, which typically hear only cases of non-violent
offenders, 173 the proposed mental health sentencing board system would be able to
handle all mentally ill offenders, regardless of the degree of the crime for which they
stand accused. This would ensure that the system of therapeutic jurisprudence is
implemented with respect to all mentally ill offenders.
Creation of a mental health sentencing board would also ensure that more expert
and effective treatment decisions are made. Courts have generally questioned the
ability of lay jurors to comprehend and synthesize complicated mental health
information, particularly in criminal cases.' 74 Even ifjurors are able to comprehend the
mental health information, jurors often ignore this information and base their decision
on other, less relevant factors.' 75 There is also the possibility that jurors will be unable
to render an unbiased verdict after hearing evidence of mental illness, 76 believing that
it is their duty to protect society from this mental illness.
7 7
CONCLUSION
A long-standing fundamental principle of the American criminal justice system is
that one is "innocent until proven guilty." Although not completely violating this
principle, the criminal justice system's current treatment of the mentally ill offends this
principle. The criminal justice system lacks a uniform insanity standard that correctly
identifies offenders who are mentally ill. This improper designation of offenders
effectively labels mentally ill offenders as guilty and places these offenders in regular
corrective institutions with little or no mental health treatment. The problem is that
171. Alexander, supra note 75, at 12 (noting that "the primary goal of the [review board] is
protection of the public, and monitoring is its key function") (footnote omitted); see also Blau &
Pasewark, supra note 71, at 104 ("The legislation was written to protect society and more
closely monitor those pleading NGRI.").
172. See Alexander, supra note 75, at 27 ("[Pllacing persons under the jurisdiction of the
Board has been favored by those persons involved with the system." (alteration in original)
(quoting OR. HOUSE JUDICIARY COMM., PSYCHIATRIC SECTION REvIEw BOARD REPORT ON H.B.
2075 (1983) (report by Felicia M. Gniewosz, Executive Director))).
173. See supra text accompanying note 139.
174. See Byers, supra note 14, at 499-500 (quoting Learned Hand's belief that "[t]he jury is
not a competent tribunal") (alteration in original); see also Blau & Pasewark, supra note 71, at
87 ("[lIt has been evidenced consistently that mock jurors have a low rate of comprehension of
the major insanity rules.").
175. See, e.g., RITA JAMES SIMON, THE JURY & THE DEFENSE OFINSANITY 154 (1999) (noting
that one factor ranking extremely high in influencing a juror's verdict is "the extent to which the
defendant resembled or failed to resemble someone whom the juror knew to be mentally ill").
176. See JENNIFER LYNNE SKEEM, UNDERSTANDING JUROR DECISION MAKING AND BIAS IN
INSANITY DEFENSE CASES: THE ROLE OF LAY CONCEPTIONS AND CASE-RELEVANT ATITUDES 6
(1999) (concluding that "juror's verdicts may depend more upon their attitudes and opinions
than on case facts and court instruction").
177. See SIMON, supra note 175, at 146 ("These jurors felt that it was their responsibility to
prevent any further extension of this [mental illness] and they viewed a verdict of guilty as the
first act in their program of reform.").
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these offenders were never proven guilty of the underlying crime. Although they may
have committed the underlying crime, their mental illness precludes them from having
the requisite mens rea/guilty mind to commit the crime; yet, they face the same
punishment as sane offenders proven to have the requisite mens rea.
This Note has attempted to assess and respond to current problems within the
criminal justice system by offering a solution that has been made possible by recent
United States Supreme Court case law. In order to correct the existing deficiencies in
the insanity defense system, the criminal justice system needs to readopt a
rehabilitative focus on treatment. 178 Adoption of the superior GEl verdict would
increase uniformity of insanity determinations while more accurately assessing the
offender's sanity, thereby allowing the opportunity for mental health treatment when
appropriate. Creation of a mental health sentencing board would ensure that mentally
ill offenders receive adequate treatment before being released back into society.
Dangerous mentally ill offenders would be appropriately confined to proper treatment
facilities while receiving treatment. Mentally ill offenders would be less of a financial
burden to society since they would be able to return to society as productive members
following treatment. The fundamental notions of the criminal justice system would also
be upheld by this recommended system. Mentally ill offenders would no longer be
sentenced as if they had the mens rea required for committing the crime. Instead,
mentally ill offenders would receive a constitutionally valid sentence that is
proportional to their degree of culpability, thus accurately reflecting the criminal
justice system's notion of criminal culpability.
178. See Bernstein & Seltzer, supra note 3, at 162 (noting that the criminal justice sector is
"ill-equipped to address the needs of people with mental illnesses").
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